Bitcoin Covenants Part 6: FE Covenants - Enforcing covenants through cryptographically restricted signing keys
FE covenants encode spending constraints into the signing key, so only transactions that satisfy a predefined condition can be signed.
To create an FE signature for a covenant spend, the signer takes a tx that conforms to the spending policy and encrypts it to mpk. Using the encrypted tx, together with the encrypted k and the functional key published by the authority, they can then evaluate f.
The function f signs tx with k tweaked by the hash of the spending policy. A transaction that breaks the spending policy of the address that holds the coins could at best be signed for some other, differently tweaked public key that does not control the funds. The function f can also be designed to block such a signature outright.
Expressiveness beyond OP_CTV
The general version of FE-based covenants with f(k, tx, program, proof) is strictly more expressive than OP_CTV. The general function proposed by Rubin takes a program that checks a condition on the transaction at spend time, and a zero-knowledge proof that the program accepts the transaction.
This zero-knowledge proof facilitates the implementation of the FE scheme, but does not add to it conceptually. A single fixed f works either way. Without the proof, f would have to be a general interpreter that runs any given program on tx itself. Such an f is large and costly to evaluate under FE.
With the proof, f only has to verify a succinct proof. This could make it possible to enforce arbitrarily complex covenants without the need for more complexity in f. The proof also lets a spending policy depend on data outside the transaction, such as the result of an off-chain computation.
Cryptographic cost
Goldwasser et al. (2014) introduced multi-input FE and built it on indistinguishability obfuscation. Multi-input FE and obfuscation are known to imply one another. Ananth and Jain (2015) showed that even single-input FE for general circuits yields obfuscation once it is made compact.
The cryptographic primitive this design needs is therefore at least as hard to build as so-called indistinguishability obfuscation itself. Implementations of this principle remain at toy scale. Carmer, Malozemoff and Raykova (2017) needed 3.7 hours to obfuscate a 12-bit pseudorandom function, a toy circuit of about 62,000 gates with a 64-bit key, far smaller than ECDSA signing on 256-bit numbers. The obfuscated program took 120 GB of disk space, and an evaluation ran for 67 minutes with 128 GB of RAM.
The cost of implementing such a scheme would fall on whoever produces the signature, not on Bitcoin nodes. The authors called this βstill far from practical.β
Furthermore, FE schemes that are practical cover only narrow function classes, such as the inner products of Abdalla et al. (2015), and the type of ECDSA signing required for Bitcoin covenants is not among them. Rubinβs paper concedes this point and lists under-developed cryptography and the setup trust assumption among its downsides.
CTV-style opcodes remain far more efficient in bytes and verification, but require a base-layer change.
In our next article, we turn to Un-FEβd Covenants, which Rubin proposed to approximate covenant behavior without relying on impractical FE schemes. It replaces FE with oracle signers bonded through BitVM. [alloc]initβs Bitcoin PIPEs began in 2024 as an FE design and moved in 2026 to witness encryption. This proposal will also be covered in a follow-up article.
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