What Happened to Silicon Valley?
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On October 16, 2026, I delivered the second Annual Margaret Levi Lecture in Political Economy in conjunction with the AI and History conference at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.
This is my original lecture as written, which incorporates material from many pieces I've written over the years. As delivered, I departed significantly from the script, as you can see from the embedded video below or the transcript that you can see at the link above.
It's an honor to give a lecture in Margaret Levi's name. I've been asked to reflect on the changes in the political economy of Silicon Valley throughout my 40-plus year career in and about it, and I can't imagine a better framing for my remarks than Margaret's vision.
Margaret understood that advances in our ability to work together are essential to a better future. Cooperation is the human superpower. She also asks what happens when the systems of cooperation we have constructed over time stop holding up their end of the bargain. That is very much the question that Silicon Valley is facing today.
An industry that pioneered advances in collective intelligence at scale used to engender love from its customers because of the way it solved new problems in their lives. It now too often inspires fear and loathing. How did things go so wrong?
The Web I Thought We Were Building in 1993
But let me start with my own history. I started my company more than 40 years ago with a $500 initial investment. We took in no venture capital, and we built a business that now generates hundreds of millions of dollars in profitable annual revenue, funded by customers who love our products and pay us for them. We got there the slow way, through steady organic growth.
That is quite anathema to the rush to the top of whatever appears to be the latest hill that seems to characterize Silicon Valley today. Even when climbing that hill traps a company at a local maximum, the hope is to get to payday before the industry moves on to the next hill.
My original corporate goal was stated as simply "Interesting work for interesting people." That evolved into two principles:
- "Change the world by spreading the knowledge of innovators"
- "Create more value than you capture."
Those principles shaped not only my company but what I expected the internet to be. When we launched GNN, the Global Network Navigator, in 1993, it was the first web portal and the first ad-supported site on the World Wide Web, and for two years it was the place people went to find other sites.
What we built was a machine for pointing you at the best of what other people had made, and then getting out of your way. Even our idea of advertising was not what you think of today. It was inspired by direct mail advertising, where you'd read articles in a print magazine or look at accompanying ads, and then you'd call an 800 number or circle a number on a "bingo card" that you'd send in to the publisher so that the advertiser could send you a brochure.
I realized that the web would be a good replacement for that awkward system, that every company ought to have its own website that provided more information about its products and services. What we invented was not the "grab your attention" kind of advertising. It was all about utility, and sharing information that customers really wanted and needed.
In short, it was the commercial web, which no one any longer thinks of as advertising, even though it is the most durable and useful kind.
The commercial web was only a small part of what the web became. The web was the playground of amateurs, not entrepreneurs. It was a marvelous collective work of human imagination, creativity, sharing, and ultimately (though that became toxic only later), competition for attention.
Our hand-curated catalog of the best websites was soon surpassed by algorithmic solutions like those provided by Google. The amount of content produced was far larger than purely human curation could manage. It was an early example of what Richard Sutton was later to call "the bitter lesson" in his analysis of AI training.
In my 2005 essay "What Is Web 2.0?" I described how the companies that survived the dotcom bust had all, in one way or another, figured out how to help people navigate the resulting information explosion at scale. As Herbert Simon noted in 1971, an abundance of information leads to a scarcity of attention.
In the face of increasing information abundance, he predicted that we would use machines to help us better allocate our time and attention. And so it has transpired: Information has become so abundant that it defies manual curation. Instead, powerful, proprietary algorithmic systems use the data they collect to match users with the answers, news, entertainment, products, applications, and services they seek. Today's AI is in many ways a continuation of this arc.
I called this "harnessing collective intelligence." All of it was, in economic terms, a set of remarkable advances in networked, data-enabled market coordination. It felt like a public good even when it was privately owned.
Hal Varian, formerly Google's chief economist, once told me that only about 6% of Google search result pages carry any advertising or are otherwise monetized by Google. The other 94% were served up by search in a glorious demonstration of abundance, the surplus of value created over value captured.
And while many of the pages themselves were commercial, even more were the product of the joyful exuberance of humanity, people creating and sharing for the joy of it. Google's algorithm matched that creation to the people who wanted it, with no price involved anywhere in the transaction.
Forty thousand times a second, Google's organic search algorithms were performing the coordination that twentieth-century economists thought could only be done by self-interested actors haggling over prices. And for Google's first decade and a half, the priced market of advertising ran alongside organic search as a sidecar, not the engine.
That's the Silicon Valley I signed up for. Some of this is nostalgia. The early web had plenty wrong with it, its share of greedy hustlers and hypesters. But value creation for both users and suppliers was the winning strategy. Companies won by solving real problems for their customers. Investors won when the company delivered on their promises.
Unfortunately, that didn't last.
The Turn to the Dark Side
Google, a company once known for "Don't be evil," now faces the same surveillance-capitalism charges as Facebook, a company that never made any such promise. On Google, advertising now pushes organic search far down the page. Especially on mobile, you often scroll through pages of ads from national chains before you reach the site that has the best answer to your question. And in today's AI-mode search, even the content is served up directly by Google, with far less traffic sent on to the sites that provide it.
Likewise, Amazon, which used to call itself the most customer-centric company on earth, now puts sixteen ads and four organic results on a typical search results page. Sometimes, it may take scrolling past three screens of results to reach the first organic search result. And by "the first organic search result," I mean "the best guess of the company's smartest algorithms for what the user is actually looking for." In former times, that was the top result. No more.
The reason isn't that good people turned bad. It's in the overriding economic incentives of today's shareholder capitalism. The extractive behavior the tech giants exhibit has been the norm for modern companies since Milton Friedman reset its objective in 1970, in a sentence that became doctrine: "The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits."
Harvard Business School, through the work of Meckling and Jensen, enshrined that view not only into corporate law but executive compensation. Whatever people's original motives, the logic of the market eventually prevails, except in extraordinary cases. In his recent book Incorruptible, Eric Ries describes a set of institutions, norms, and guardrails that can help to safeguard the values of a company, but you can count on your fingers and toes the high profile companies that have successfully deployed them to resist the market.
Even tax policy rewards capital appreciation by taxing it at a much lower rate than labor income. Our corporations and the financial markets that govern them and reward them are a kind of machine, what the science fiction writer Charlie Stross calls a "slow AI." We built it. We set its objective function to reward shareholders and ignore everyone else. And then we tell everyone that it is a marvelous self-correcting system.
This is an illusion. As I put it in "We Have Already Let the Genie Out of the Bottle," an essay I wrote for a Rockefeller Foundation workshop on regulating AI: Attempts at governance are futile until we recognize that we have built a machine and set it on its course. Instead, we pretend that the market is a natural phenomenon best left alone, and we fail to hold its mechanism designers to account.
We need to tear down and rebuild that machine, reprogramming it so that human flourishing, not corporate profit, becomes its goal.
If the problem were just villains, you could fix things by firing them or shaming them or suing them or otherwise holding them to account. But if the problem is the design of the entire system, everyone is eventually incentivized to seek the same result. The machine rewards outsized growth of revenue and profit and brutally punishes any slowdown. Not only that, stock options tie every employee's fortune to that reward.
Criticizing a company for turning extractive isn't really about the values of a company or the character of its executives and employees, it's about the incentives that have been given to them.
Rising Tide Rents and Robber Baron Rents
Silicon Valley is a mirror of what's wrong with our economy and our corporate governance, not the cause of it, and not even the worst exemplar. Tobacco, oil, pharma companies, and far too much of Wall Street vie for that spot. But Silicon Valley is a great place to study what went wrong, because companies rise and fall so quickly, making them the equivalent of laboratory mice or flatworms, where patterns can be quickly identified and followed across generations.
A few years ago, I found a useful language for describing what I was seeing in the theory of economic rents. The essential idea is that when the reward accruing to an actor is larger than their contribution to value creation, the difference is rent. To the classical economists, to Smith and Ricardo and Mill, living in a world of inherited privilege, rents were not a temporary aberration on the way to equilibrium. They were both a persistent consequence and a persistent source of inequality.
Joseph Schumpeter had a different idea, that disproportionate profits can be a reward for innovation. An innovator can earn outsized profits during the expansive phase of a new technology, when it's solving new problems and creating value not just for consumers but for a whole ecosystem of suppliers and intermediaries and even competitors.
When economists talk about rent-seeking today, though, many of them mean what George Stigler called "regulatory capture" and what the public choice school built into its doctrine: rents extracted through government intervention at the behest of those who lobby officials and bureaucrats to get their way in despite the free market.
The rents I want to talk about are a different animal. They are collected in the market, not around it, by private firms with enormous power, whose power is unchecked precisely because the government has stepped back.
For my purposes here, speaking about the rents that accrue to Silicon Valley companies, I divide them into two rough categories. The first is what I call rising tide rents. This fits with the classical idea of rent as a reward accruing to an actor that is larger than its contribution to value creation, but it is a virtuous kind, a kind of communal value creation, often the result of positive government interventions.
Consider the rise in home prices that accrues to a homeowner who lives in a neighborhood that is improved by better schools or improved roads, which then may lead to new shops and restaurants or the home improvements made by neighbors. This is also a kind of unearned income. Everyone shares the improvements in quality of life. But homeowners get something bigger, the unearned income from the appreciation in home value.
In a similar way, leading companies make massive improvements to the neighborhood, so to speak, and we all benefit. I should point out that government plays a significant role in these improvements. It's easy to forget the NSF grant that funded the research that became Google, the loan guarantees that made Tesla possible, and government as the founding customer for SpaceX's commercial launch services.
It's a rising tide that lifts all boats, and the fact that the market leader takes the biggest share of it is not, to my mind, a scandal. But Schumpeter thought those outsized profits would eventually be competed away as knowledge diffuses through society.
What is a scandal is the way that Business Strategy 101 and corporate governance today teach companies to build moats and barriers to keep profits high even when the company stops earning rewards by innovating and better serving customers. Companies do this by turning to the second category of rents, which I call robber baron rents, the income above a competitive rate that gets collected because of asymmetries in power, the way the medieval baron's troops collected their share of the harvest whether or not the baron had contributed anything to growing it.
The same company can collect both kinds of rent at different stages in its lifecycle. As far as I can tell, the shift from one to the other is c
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