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Quad9 Is Leaving France: Why DNS Resolvers Are the Wrong Place to Fight Piracy

On Tuesday, November 24, 2026, Quad9 will stop answering DNS queries from France.

Quad9 is the Swiss non-profit behind the free 9.9.9.9 resolver, which blocks malware and phishing domains. It is not leaving because of costs or lack of users. It is leaving because a Paris court fined it for refusing to block a list of pirate sports-streaming domains on behalf of beIN Sports.

With around 20 similar cases still pending in France, leaving the country is the only option Quad9 can afford. Cloudflare, which runs the competing 1.1.1.1 resolver, called the departure "a canary in the coal mine", and the post reached the front page of Hacker News.

In that thread, Quad9's CTO John Todd asked readers to write "a long-form, well-reasoned statement of why France is taking the wrong path", with plenty of sources, and to send it to policymakers. This is our attempt. Every claim below links to a primary document, a court ruling, or contemporaneous reporting.

What Quad9 is, and why it matters

A DNS resolver turns a name like example.com into an IP address your computer can connect to. Most people use their ISP's resolver without knowing it.

A public resolver is one anyone can point their device or network at instead, such as Google's 8.8.8.8, Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1, Cisco's OpenDNS, or Quad9's 9.9.9.9.

Quad9 has a few properties that make it unusual:

  • It is a non-profit. It was founded in 2017 by the Global Cyber Alliance, IBM, and Packet Clearing House, and moved its legal seat to Zürich in 2021, hosted by SWITCH, specifically so that its privacy promises would be backed by Swiss law. As John Todd put it at the time: "Privacy policies which are not backed by law are empty promises."
  • Security filtering is its main purpose. Quad9 refuses to resolve domains that threat-intelligence feeds flag as malware, phishing, or botnet infrastructure. Its about page claims 670 million+ blocks a day across 230+ resolver clusters in over 110 countries.
  • It keeps no user records. Quad9 does not know who its users are, and that is the point.

Organisations have come to depend on it. Mullvad shut down its own public encrypted DNS service on November 2, 2026 and moved Mullvad Browser users with default settings to Quad9, funding Quad9 instead. (Mullvad Browser users in France will now be migrated to a resolver that disappears three weeks later.)

Quad9's announcement lists dozens of French networks it sees traffic from, including the interministerial digital directorate DINUM, France Travail, CEA, Institut Pasteur, RENATER, EDF, SNCF, AP-HM hospitals in Marseille, France Télévisions, Thales, and Airbus's Stormshield.

Quad9 can't tell any of them it is leaving. As Cloudflare points out, when a resolver disappears, users don't see an error message. "Their Internet will simply stop working."

How France got here

The law: Article L.333-10 of the Code du sport

The legal basis for all of this is Article L.333-10 of the French sports code. It was created by Law 2021-1382 of October 25, 2021, the same law that merged HADOPI and the CSA into the new regulator Arcom.

L.333-10 lets a sports rightsholder go to the president of the Paris judicial court and obtain "dynamic" blocking orders, meaning orders that cover sites already identified plus new mirror domains notified later through Arcom, against "toute personne susceptible de contribuer à y remédier" (any person able to help stop the infringement). That last phrase is what puts DNS resolvers in scope.

In July 2026, Parliament passed Law 2026-725 on professional sport, which amended L.333-10 and added an automated real-time blocking system run by Arcom. TorrentFreak reported that under the new system "ARCOM's agents no longer approve each block in advance." Quad9 called it "recklessly dangerous."

The cases: from ISPs to everyone

The timeline shows how the circle of targets has widened:

  • Dec 2023: Canal+ sues Cloudflare, Google and Cisco under L.333-10 to force DNS blocking of football piracy sites.
  • May-Jun 2024: The Paris court orders the three resolvers to block ~117 domains. Google complies. Cisco pulls OpenDNS out of France on June 28, 2024, citing a court order "issued under Article L.333-10 of the French Sport code" (archived notice).
  • Sep-Oct 2024: New orders expand blocking by Google and Cloudflare.
  • Dec 2024: Canal+ wins three orders against Quad9 and Vercara (Premier League, Champions League, Top 14 rugby). Because it can't geolocate users, Quad9 blocks the domains for the whole world: "we have to block these sites for all users, in all areas."
  • May 2025: A beIN request against Google, Cloudflare and Quad9 is rejected for lack of evidence. Quad9 didn't defend that case at all, citing lack of resources.
  • Mar 2026: The Paris Court of Appeal rejects five appeals by Google, Cloudflare and Cisco (RG 24/09372), the first appellate approval of DNS blocking under L.333-10: "Any filtering measure can be circumvented, and this possibility does not render the measures in question ineffective." The same month, the court issues simultaneous orders against 19 ISPs, Google, Cloudflare, Quad9 and VPN providers.
  • Apr 2026: Canal+ obtains orders against Whalebone's EU-funded DNS4EU resolver, which complies by blocking "globally across our resolver tiers."
  • May 13, 2026: beIN Sports obtains an order (RG 26/02207) requiring Quad9 to block IPTV sites showing the WTA women's tennis tour until the season ends on November 14. It starts with 6 domains and grows to 58 via Arcom notifications.
  • Jul 2026: 14 new Canal+ orders for the 2026/27 season target ISPs, Google, Quad9, DNS4EU, Cloudflare, VPNs, and Bing.
  • Oct 7, 2026: The court refuses penalties against Cloudflare, NordVPN and Surfshark because each had made some effort to block. Cloudflare kept 1.1.1.1 out of it by acting through its CDN instead.
  • Oct 21, 2026: The court imposes a €1,000/day penalty on Quad9 (RG 26/11882).
  • Oct 22, 2026: Quad9 announces it will leave France on November 24.

The ruling itself

The 21 October judgment is short and worth reading. A few details matter:

  • The €580,000 figure was beIN's request, not the penalty. beIN asked for €10,000 per day per domain still reachable; across 58 domains that is €580,000 a day. The judge set €1,000 a day in total, running until the end of the WTA season on November 14.
  • The judge used Quad9's malware filtering against it. Quad9 argued it could not implement geolocated blocking. The court (para. 16) replied that Quad9 "appears to contradict itself" because it already "applies automated filtering strictly limited to cybersecurity to neutralise malicious domains on a global scale." The fact that a resolver can drop a name for everyone was treated as proof it can drop a name for France.
  • Refusing to try was enough. Paragraph 18: "Bound by an obligation of means, the Quad9 foundation states that it implements none in order to execute the decision. This circumstance alone justifies the imposition of a penalty."

€1,000 a day for three weeks is survivable, about €24,000. Twenty more cases like it, each running for a full football season with ever-growing domain lists and Arcom's new automated system feeding them, is not. Quad9 says: "Quad9 cannot survive the accumulation of penalties yet to be assessed in 20 other pending cases."

Why Quad9 can't just comply

Quad9 is often asked why it doesn't just block the domains. It has three options, and none of them work.

  1. Block globally. This is what Quad9 did for Canal+ in December 2024 and what DNS4EU does today. It means a French court decides what a user in Brazil, Kenya or Germany can resolve, for the commercial benefit of one company. Quad9's announcement asks how France would react if other nations imposed their laws on French users through DNS. The answer is obvious, and the reverse should be too. Nothing limits this to sports either: once global blocking is accepted, every court in every country can add names to everyone's resolver.
  2. Geo-block France. Quad9 has already tried this, in Germany. In the Sony Music v. Quad9 case, Quad9 used geoIP blocking for German users while the case continued. Sony's lawyers used a VPN to reach the content "from Germany" anyway, the court agreed this was non-compliance, and Quad9 was fined for contempt. GeoIP is a probabilistic guess about where an IP address is, not a legal fact about where a person is. A resolver that keeps no user records has no reliable way to define a "French user." As Quad9 told TorrentFreak: "There is no legally useful way for us to define a French user." Even the French order is geographically complicated: heise notes it covers the overseas departments and Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon but excludes New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia.
  3. Pay and fight. Quad9 won in Germany. The Dresden Higher Regional Court held in December 2023 that DNS resolvers get the same liability privilege as access providers, and the German civil rights group GFF said "the judgement puts the onus on rights holders." But winning took "several years, six figures of cost to Quad9, and massive wasted time," and the opposition, in Quad9's words, "has more lawyers than we have money and time." As Quad9 wrote in 2025, compliance costs that are routine overhead for Google are, "for small, mission-driven nonprofits like Quad9, … an existential threat."

That leaves leaving.

Why DNS blocking doesn't work

The argument against resolver blocking isn't only about Quad9's survival. Even on its own terms, it does not do what the rightsholders want.

It doesn't remove anything. The DNS only holds pointers. Quad9's Dresden write-up puts it this way: "The DNS does not contain content - it is a system designed for delivery only of pointers." The pirate server stays online and keeps serving everyone who reaches it some other way. The Internet Society's 2025 guide for legal professionals says the same thing.

It takes seconds to bypass. Quad9 notes there are thousands of other open resolvers. Users can also run their own, or use encrypted DNS over HTTPS (RFC 8484), which looks like ordinary web traffic. Arcom's own December 2025 study for the National Assembly says 20% of French internet users already use an alternative DNS resolver and 29% use a VPN. Quad9 compares DNS blocking to "holding a piece of newspaper in front of a stadium full of people to block the view of a concert."

It is blunt. DNS works at the level of whole domains. A resolver can't block one infringing stream on a shared host without blocking everything else on that name. The IAB's RFC 7754, the IETF's standard reference on blocking and filtering, says: "From a technical perspective, there are no perfect or even good solutions -- there is only least bad." ICANN's security committee revisited the question in SAC127, "DNS Blocking Revisited" (2025), warning implementers to minimise overblocking and avoid affecting users outside their jurisdiction.

France's own registry operator, AFNIC, made the core point years ago in its scientific council's report on the consequences of DNS filtering: "Le DNS n'a pas été conçu pour filtrer les contenus." (The DNS was not designed to filter content.)

It is opaque. When a resolver is forced to lie, the user sees a site that doesn't load. They have no way to tell whether the site is down, their network is broken, or a court ordered the block. There is a standard for being honest about this: RFC 8914 Extended DNS Errors defines code 16, "Censored", for answers withheld "due to an external requirement imposed by an entity other than the operator." But nothing in the French orders requires resolvers to use it.

Blocking at scale causes real collateral damage. France is not the only test case. Italy's Piracy Shield system blocked Google Drive for much of the country in October 2024. A RIPE Labs study of Piracy Shield found more than 500 unrelated sites blocked and concluded that "IP-level blocking is an indiscriminate tool with consequences that outweigh its benefits." In Spain, LaLiga's IP blocking of shared Cloudflare addresses knocked innocent sites offline every match day, leading Cloudflare's CEO Matthew Prince to call the approach "bonkers". The same RIPE study found most European piracy is hosted in Europe, which is where enforcement belongs: at the hosting provider.

Measured by its own goals, the French system has a mixed record. Arcom reports 12,606 sports domains blocked since 2022, 6,496 of them in 2025 alone (up 71%), while piracy fell 4% in 2025 and 34% since 2021. The number of blocks is growing much faster than piracy is shrinking, and Arcom's figures don't separate the effect of resolver blocking from ISP blocking. Every one of those domains has to be found, blocked, and then found again when it reappears under a new name.

OONI's 2025 measurement of French ISP blocking found that of 542 domains tested, 291 were blocked by at least one ISP but only 132 by all four. The European Commission's own 2025 assessment of its live-events piracy recommendation concluded the effects "have been limited and have not allowed to significantly curb the volume of online piracy of live events."

What France loses

Driving Quad9 out of France doesn't hurt pirates at all. The people who lose are the ones who chose a resolver for security.

  • French users lose a malware filter. Quad9 exists to stop people resolving phishing and malware domains. Users who move to an unfiltered resolver, or to their ISP's resolver, lose that protection. Users who move to an unknown free resolver may be trading it for one that sells their browsing data. As Cloudflare puts it, "Penalizing transparent services only pushes users toward less accountable corners of the web."
  • Critical infrastructure may break silently. Hospitals, utilities and local authorities on Quad9's list will lose DNS if their IT teams miss the announcement. Em
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