Autonomous Driving Software - Ch.11: SOTIF and Safety Validation [EN]
STATERA Library · Series 08 · Volume 12 · Chapter 11 · EN
Volume 12. Autonomous Driving Software Chapter 11. SOTIF and Safety Validation
11.01. SOTIF ISO 21448 Framework and Intended Behavior
Safety of the Intended Functionality (SOTIF), standardized in ISO 21448, addresses hazards that can arise even when an automated driving system contains no conventional hardware or software fault.
The central concern is whether the intended functionality itself can produce unsafe behavior because of performance limitations, insufficient situational understanding, foreseeable misuse, or operating conditions that exceed the capabilities assumed during system design.
This perspective complements functional safety. ISO 26262 primarily addresses hazards caused by malfunctioning behavior of electrical and electronic systems, whereas SOTIF focuses on hazards caused by functional insufficiencies or reasonably foreseeable misuse when components are operating as designed.
For autonomous driving and outdoor AMRs, both perspectives are necessary because a technically healthy perception or planning module may still produce an unsafe decision when confronted with ambiguous or unfamiliar conditions.
The concept of intended behavior is fundamental to SOTIF. Intended behavior describes how the system is expected to perceive its environment, interpret situations, select actions, and control the vehicle within defined operating conditions.
It includes normal driving behavior, interaction with other road users, responses to uncertain perception, transitions between operating states, and fallback actions when confidence or environmental conditions become unacceptable.
Intended behavior must therefore be connected explicitly to the Operational Design Domain (ODD). The ODD defines the environmental, geographic, operational, traffic, infrastructure, weather, illumination, speed, and other conditions within which an automated function is designed to operate.
A behavior considered sufficiently safe inside this domain may become inappropriate outside it, making ODD monitoring and boundary detection important elements of the safety architecture.
SOTIF analysis distinguishes situations according to whether they are known or unknown and whether they are safe or unsafe.
Known safe scenarios represent understood operating conditions in which the intended functionality behaves acceptably. Known unsafe scenarios are hazardous conditions already identified during development. Unknown unsafe scenarios are particularly important because they contain hazardous combinations or triggering conditions that developers have not yet discovered.
This classification creates an iterative safety objective. Development seeks to demonstrate acceptable behavior in known scenarios, identify and mitigate known unsafe conditions, and systematically reduce the space of unknown unsafe conditions.
Complete elimination of uncertainty is generally unrealistic for complex autonomous systems, so SOTIF engineering emphasizes structured evidence that residual risk has been reduced and that limitations are detected, controlled, or bounded appropriately.
A triggering condition is a specific circumstance that exposes a functional insufficiency and may lead to hazardous behavior. Examples include:
- low contrast, glare, fog, partial occlusion, unusual object geometry, degraded road markings, sensor interference, ambiguous free-space boundaries, or unexpected pedestrian behavior.
The triggering condition is not necessarily a component failure; rather, it reveals a limitation in perception, prediction, planning, localization, or control.
For outdoor AMRs, triggering conditions extend beyond conventional road-driving assumptions. Gravel, mud, slopes, curbs, potholes, vegetation, construction materials, reflective surfaces, loading equipment, irregular pedestrian movement, GNSS degradation, and rapidly changing work zones can alter the relationship between perception and actual traversability.
Safety validation must consequently represent both semantic scene understanding and the physical interaction between the robot, terrain, payload, and environment.
Functional insufficiencies can originate throughout the autonomy pipeline. A camera may correctly operate yet fail to provide sufficient information under glare. A LiDAR may return valid measurements that are difficult to interpret around reflective or absorptive materials. A neural network may produce a plausible but incorrect classification, while a planner may generate a mathematically valid trajectory based on incomplete predictions.
SOTIF considers how such limitations propagate toward hazardous vehicle behavior. Perception uncertainty is especially significant because downstream modules often consume estimates rather than direct knowledge of the environment.
Detection confidence, localization covariance, object-track stability, map consistency, terrain uncertainty, and sensor disagreement can therefore become safety-relevant information.
Instead of treating uncertain inputs as ordinary measurements, a SOTIF-oriented architecture can propagate uncertainty and use it to restrict speed, increase safety margins, trigger redundancy, or initiate fallback behavior.
The intended behavior specification should define more than nominal motion. It should describe what the autonomous system does when evidence is incomplete, contradictory, delayed, or outside validated limits.
Conservative speed reduction, increased following distance, trajectory rejection, controlled stopping, restricted maneuvering, operator notification, or transition to a minimal risk condition can become explicit behaviors associated with uncertainty thresholds and operational boundaries.
Safety validation consequently requires scenarios that connect operating conditions, triggering conditions, functional limitations, system responses, and potential hazards. A scenario is valuable not simply because it produces many kilometers of simulated or physical operation, but because it exercises meaningful combinations of parameters near behavioral boundaries.
Parameterized scenario families allow weather, illumination, object motion, terrain, sensor quality, localization uncertainty, and interaction patterns to be varied systematically.
SOTIF validation therefore benefits from multiple complementary sources of evidence. Simulation provides scalable exploration and controlled parameter variation, software-in-the-loop and hardware-in-the-loop testing expose implementation and integration effects, proving-ground tests reproduce selected critical scenarios, and field operation reveals naturalistic situations that may not have been anticipated.
Fleet data can then feed discovered edge cases back into simulation, regression testing, and model improvement.
Scenario discovery is particularly important for reducing unknown unsafe behavior. Operational logs, disengagements, emergency stops, near misses, low-confidence perception events, planner rejections, unusual controller interventions, and sensor disagreement can be mined for candidate corner cases.
Machine learning, clustering, novelty detection, search-based testing, adversarial scenario generation, and large-scale simulation can expand this process beyond manually designed test catalogs.
The relationship between SOTIF and machine learning deserves special attention because learned functions derive behavior from data rather than exclusively from deterministic requirements. Dataset coverage, labeling quality, class imbalance, domain shift, rare-object representation, environmental diversity, and model uncertainty can influence intended functionality.
Safety engineering must therefore connect data governance and model evaluation to system-level scenarios instead of relying only on aggregate metrics such as average detection accuracy. A perception model with high overall accuracy can still be unacceptable if its errors concentrate in safety-critical regions of the operating domain.
Validation should examine performance conditioned on distance, relative velocity, illumination, weather, object type, occlusion, terrain, and other relevant variables.
These conditional analyses reveal performance boundaries that aggregate metrics may hide and help establish operational constraints or mitigation mechanisms around identified limitations.
SOTIF is also closely related to architectural monitoring. Runtime safety monitors can observe confidence, sensor consistency, localization integrity, trajectory feasibility, stopping distance, ODD compliance, and communication health independently from the primary autonomy logic.
When monitored variables approach validated boundaries, the system can progressively degrade functionality rather than waiting for an unmistakable failure, thereby converting uncertainty into controlled operational behavior.
For an outdoor AMR, this may produce a layered response strategy. Normal operation is permitted when perception quality, localization confidence, terrain assessment, and predicted clearance satisfy validated limits. Increasing uncertainty can reduce speed or enlarge obstacle margins. Persistent uncertainty can restrict available maneuvers, while severe or unresolved uncertainty can initiate a controlled stop or another defined minimal-risk behavior appropriate to the operational environment.
SOTIF engineering should be treated as a lifecycle process rather than a final validation activity. Assumptions about intended behavior and the ODD influence requirements, sensor selection, perception architecture, planning constraints, simulation design, data collection, and field testing.
Evidence collected during validation can reveal previously unknown limitations, which then modify requirements, models, safety mechanisms, scenario libraries, and operational constraints in subsequent development iterations.
Traceability is essential throughout this lifecycle. Identified hazards should be connected to triggering conditions, functional insufficiencies, safety requirements, mitigation mechanisms, validation scenarios, test results, and residual-risk arguments.
This creates an auditable chain from a potential unsafe behavior to the engineering evidence used to control it, supporting both technical decision-making and construction of a coherent safety case.
For autonomous driving software and outdoor AMRs, the practical value of the ISO 21448 framework is therefore not limited to compliance documentation. It provides a systematic way to ask whether correctly functioning autonomy can still behave unsafely, where its performance boundaries exist, which conditions expose those boundaries, and how the system should respond.
The resulting process links intended behavior, ODD definition, scenario discovery, uncertainty management, validation, and operational feedback into a continuous safety-engineering loop.
11.02. Hazard Analysis HARA for AV AMR Systems
Hazard Analysis and Risk Assessment (HARA) provides a systematic method for identifying hazardous behavior, evaluating its potential consequences, and deriving safety requirements for autonomous vehicles and autonomous mobile robots.
Within AV and AMR development, HARA connects operational situations with possible system behavior so that safety engineering begins from hazards experienced at the vehicle level rather than from isolated component failures.
The analysis normally begins by defining the system, its intended functionality, operational boundaries, interfaces, and relevant operating scenarios. For an autonomous driving system, these may include road type, vehicle speed, traffic interaction, weather, and infrastructure.
For an outdoor AMR, additional factors such as terrain, payload, pedestrian proximity, work-zone structure, slopes, curbs, and mixed human-machine traffic become important parts of the operational context.
A hazard represents a potential source of harm resulting from system behavior under a particular operational situation. Hazard identification therefore considers more than whether an individual sensor, processor, or actuator fails.
Unsafe acceleration, unintended steering, insufficient braking, incorrect free-space estimation, loss of localization, delayed obstacle response, or inappropriate trajectory generation can all become hazardous behaviors when combined with relevant environmental conditions.
Hazardous events are constructed by combining a hazard with an operational situation. Loss of localization alone describes a system condition, but loss of localization while an AMR travels near pedestrians or approaches a loading area forms a more meaningful hazardous event.
This scenario-oriented representation helps engineers reason about consequences at the system level and establishes a direct connection between autonomy behavior, operating context, and potential harm.
Traditional automotive HARA commonly evaluates hazardous events through severity, exposure, and controllability. Severity represents the potential level of harm if the hazardous event occurs. Exposure describes how frequently the relevant operational situation may be encountered, while controllability estimates the ability of affected persons or other participants to avoid or mitigate the resulting harm.
These dimensions provide a structured basis for risk classification and safety requirement derivation.
For AV and AMR systems, these factors require careful interpretation because autonomy changes the role of the human operator. A highly automated robot may operate without a driver who can immediately intervene, and pedestrians near the robot may have little knowledge of its internal state.
Consequently, assumptions about controllability should reflect the actual operating environment, available supervision, robot speed, stopping capability, warning me
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