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Based on that Hacker News article - "A Single Malicious Webpage Let Researchers Hijack Meta Muse and Access Private Chats" by Swati Khandelwal, Nov 21, 2026:

What NebuSec demonstrated, and what Muse's team has since fixed per NebuSec:

1. Silent exfiltration via malicious webpage:
A single malicious page that Muse opened could pull the user's private conversation history + stored memories out to an external server, and alter them - without triggering any approval prompt to the user.

Same technique could be extended to reach credentials Muse stores for the user's connected accounts.

2. Full cloud-VM takeover chain:
Researchers chained:

  • a flaw in Muse's built-in browser (used for tasks like creating PDFs)
  • to a Linux kernel flaw

...to get full control of that individual user's cloud machine.

That gave access to what Muse's design specifically walls off from the agent:

  • the credential store
  • saved files
  • Sentinel itself - the monitoring layer meant to be the single gate for anything the agent sends out

Scope was limited by design and held: compromise stayed inside that one user's cloud machine. No breakout to the shared host underneath or into other users' machines.

NebuSec says it reported everything to Muse's team and all exploits were fixed before publication yesterday. Meta has not publicly confirmed the fixes per the article, and no word on whether user data was accessed before patching.

This was different from an earlier September Muse flaw that only let malware already on a user's Mac hijack the assistant on-device - this one broke into the cloud system behind the assistant.